

Latin America) has neglected the study of coercive institutions. Nor would this literature deny that reforming the repressive or security apparatus is a precondition for genuine democratization. If its justification is thus somewhat spurious the book is nevertheless a useful contribution to our understanding of security issues in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe. This review has, for reasons of space and (to my mind) logic focused on the first situation only.

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Inequality in Northern Ireland David Smith and Gerald Chambers Oxford Clarendon Press 1991 401pp. £45.00

Inequality in Northern Ireland is proof that excellent policy-research can be executed given adequate funding and appropriate skills. One book like this one is worth a thousand on post-modernism. Smith and Chambers' conclusions, originally reported in a Policy Studies Institute (PSI) survey published in 1987, but considerably revised here, framed the 1987 report on religious and political discrimination in Northern Ireland published by the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights (SACHR). Smith and Chambers show that religious inequalities in Northern Ireland's labour markets and housing provision can not plausibly be held to be legacies of the former Stormont parliament since they have, with some exceptions, persisted under direct rule, and in some cases have worsened.

However, Unionists continue to deny that there is or was a problem of unfair employment. Smith and Chambers's poll data confirm the persistence of such denial: 68 per cent of Protestants thought Catholics and Protestants had the same chance of obtaining a job, whereas 67 per cent of Catholics thought they did not; but whereas the overwhelming majority of Catholics who believed there was inequality in job-opportunities thought Protestants had better chances than Catholics, Protestants who believed there was inequality in opportunity were evenly

development of a repressive state apparatus in Northern Ireland. The basic thesis is that sectarian security systems are 'structurally predisposed to impose highly repressive controls' (p. 7).

Weitzer traces the reform of the security apparatus in Northern Ireland after 'the collapse of settler rule', i.e. the fall of Stormont. The author claims that Britain's grand design is to remake Ulster in conformity with British political norms' (p. 200). This lead the British state into a Bonapartist role, standing above civil society and to an avoidance of a partisan role. A modern impartial police force is a prerequisite for this project. Hence the reform of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), in the years since direct rule from Westminster was imposed. Yet this process, which Weitzer calls 'liberalization' (professionalization might be more apt), is matched by a growing materialization of the RUC as, with Ulsterization it began to take on many of the roles of the British army. I believe that Weitzer over-emphasises the impartiality and accountability of the RUC as against which he calls the 'dark side of policing in Northern Ireland'.

Weitzer has framed his research in a similar way to that advanced by the democratization debate in Latin America. This leads to problems such as arguing that Britain's goals in the North of Ireland are 'favourable to democratization'. It is hard, however, to divorce Britain's role from the whole historical background of colonialism, partition and the rest of it. Weitzer is also misled by his focus on the narrow institutions of the police. No one denies the considerable changes which have taken place in the structures and procedures of the RUC since 1972. Yet it is hard to see this leading to the conclusion that the net effect of British rule has been a relaxation of repression'. Elsewhere, Weitzer, who has managed to get hold of some very interesting interviews with senior police officers, more realistically categorizes British policy in the North as one of containment.

This book is based on the dubious assumption that the literature on the transition to democracy (for example in

subject-object dualism becomes appropriate.

A book review is not the place to discuss the complex issues that are raised in this connection. It must be enough just to conclude by issuing a challenge to Nicos Mouzelis in his next book critically to confront the sociological work of Elias. *Back to Sociological Theory* provides ample testimony to the fact that Mouzelis is capable of fairly and accurately identifying the balance of strengths and weaknesses in Elias and of building constructively on his legacy. It is my opinion, nevertheless, that *Back to Sociological Theory* would have been an even better book had it involved a direction discussion of Elias. That is because such a discussion would have provided Nicos Mouzelis with an opportunity to consider whether his advocacy of both a subject-object duality and a subject-object dualism is a sociologically redundant artefact of what Elias called 'homo clausus' thinking. Is Mouzelis, after all, attempting to come to grips conceptually with anything other than the distinction between power differentials which lead actors to experience themselves and other people as objects and power differentials which do not? It was one of the achievements of Norbert Elias that he was able to explain the genesis of such experiential reification while at the same time casting serious doubt on the ontological status of the kinds of subject-object boundaries which Kantian thinking leads one to construct.

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Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe Ronald Weitzer University of California Press 1990 278pp. \$29.95

The comparative study has a long history in sociology but at first glance it seems odd to compare Northern Ireland with Zimbabwe. Certainly they both have settler populations, but that would seem as far as it goes. Nevertheless, this book does constitute a useful survey of the

provide a key for coping more effectively with the theoretical and empirical problems posed by trying to link analyses at these different levels than has usually been possible in the past.

In a short review, it is impossible to do justice to a book which is as richly productive both theoretically and empirically as *Back to Sociological Theory*. Instead of commenting on its many further positive contributions, though, I am going to close by drawing attention to what seems to me to be a strange omission. Anthony Giddens, Terry Johnson, Christopher Dandeker, Clive Ashworth and Nicos Mouzelis were all at Leicester in the 1960s and early 1970s. Their work provides testimony to the stimulating sociological environment that existed in this university in that period. However, with the exception of the occasional, usually dismissive, comment by Anthony Giddens, none of my colleagues and former colleagues – and Nicos Mouzelis now has to be added to the list – has referred in his work to what was more or less directly a major influence on all of us: Norbert Elias and the figurational or process-sociological approach that he advocated. As far as Giddens and Johnson *et al.* are concerned, this is not particularly surprising. Given their faith in philosophy and commitment to what they call *social as opposed to sociological* theory, it is easy to see why they find it difficult fully to appreciate an approach that is unmitigatedly critical of the neo-Kantian modes of thinking in which they are trapped. In the case of Mouzelis, however, this is more difficult to understand. Like Elias, he is cognizant of the fact that a sociology which is equally theoretical and empirical can provide an escape from the impasse of the abstract dichotomies into which Kantian thinking inexorably leads us. Yet he has so far been reluctant to confront Elias and it seems to me that, possibly as a result, a residual Kantianism remains in his approach. It surfaces, for example, when he suggests that, while a subject-object duality is adequate for conceptualizing interactions and social systems to which actors contribute significantly, in situations where they contribute only slightly a concept of

divided between those who thought Catholics had better chances, those who thought Protestants had a better chance, and those who thought it depended on the area. The objective evidence, definitively recorded here, is wildly at odds with most Protestants' perceptions. A Catholic man is two and a half times as likely to be unemployed as a Protestant man, and a Catholic woman is over one and a half times as likely to be unemployed as a Protestant woman. However, denial of direct or indirect discrimination in employment continues to be articulated by Unionist politicians, and they draw for their support upon academic arguments which suggest that the employment differentials between Catholic and Protestant both in absolute levels and relative status are rooted in cultural differences between the two communities.

Nine explanations which *apparently* do not rely on illegal discrimination or inequality of opportunity to account for the differences between Catholic and Protestant employment levels were identified and tested to destruction by Smith and Chambers. The first eight are: (i) fewer jobs are available in Catholic than in Protestant areas, an explanation which requires the specification of 'journey-to-work areas'; (ii) Catholics tend to be concentrated in depressed industries to a greater extent than Protestants; (iii) a higher proportion of Catholics than of Protestants belong to the lower socioeconomic groups, which are far more likely to experience unemployment than the higher ones; (iv) Protestants are more likely than Catholics to have the skills and qualifications required for the available jobs; (v) people with a low-earning potential and a large number of dependent children (disproportionately Catholic) are likely to choose not to work because they derive more from welfare benefits than from employment; (vi) the number of economically active Catholics is growing while the number of Protestants is stable; (vii) a higher proportion of Catholics than of Protestants belong to the younger age cohorts which are subject to higher levels of unemployment; and (viii) a growing population (Catholics) will have a higher rate of unemployment than

a static one, even if members of the two groups have the same chance of getting a job.

The authors point out that many of these eight explanations take the historic background of institutionalised discrimination for granted. Thus explanations (ii) and (vi) rely on the assumption that Protestants and Catholics operate in separate labour markets which must have come from somewhere; whereas explanations (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v), if true, take for granted that Catholics are disproportionately concentrated amongst the poor and the educationally disadvantaged rather than asking why that is so. Thus even if many of these eight explanations were correct, which Smith and Chambers successfully question, they would still be 'compatible with explanations based on discrimination or inequality of opportunity'. However, some of the explanations are just wrong: thus explanation (vii) faces the double difficulty that the contrast in unemployment rates amongst Catholic and Protestant men remains constant across age-cohorts, except among the youngest cohort (aged 16-24) in which Catholics do *relatively* better. Other explanations account for only a very small portion of the variation in employment-opportunities: thus explanation (iv) faces the problem that the differences between Catholics and Protestants in academic qualifications cannot account for the scale of the variation in employment-opportunities, and when academic and practical qualifications are held constant, very large differences remain between Protestant and Catholic unemployment-rates. Locational explanations of differential employment-opportunities are also effectively refuted: throughout Northern Ireland there is a fairly uniform tendency for Catholics to have a higher chance of being unemployed than comparable Protestants (in age, gender, socioeconomic group, skills and qualifications). The authors accept that there is some validity for explanation (v), but observe that the contrast in unemployment-rates between Catholic and Protestant males with the same number of children remains striking 'except that it is much reduced among

those with four or more children'. They note, incidentally, that there is a simple but expensive policy-solution: pay a constant amount of child-benefit regardless of whether the male member of the household is in or out of work. The ninth explanation, viz. the thesis that (ix) 'Protestants and Catholics belong to separate labour markets and the Catholic sector offers fewer opportunities than the Protestant one in relation to the pool of labour belonging to it', is not an explanation independent of discrimination because it presupposes ethnic labour markets.

In Smith and Chambers' regression model, after socio-economic status, number of children, age, travel-to-work area and academic or practical qualifications are taken into consideration, the difference in rate of unemployment amongst Catholics and Protestants is reduced, compared with the actual rates, but 'for the typical group selected, the rate of unemployment predicted for Catholics is almost double the rate for Protestants in most travel-to-work areas'; and, as they remark, their model *understates* the scale of inequality of opportunity since present social policy discriminates against large families.

The original PSI study was subjected to extended criticism. The authors have accepted some minor criticisms, and re-run some of their workings, but maintain, convincingly, that their conclusions are robust. One point emphasized by the SACHR, and not by the PSI's first three reports, was important: differences in religious unemployment-rates can be partially explained by differential employment in security-related occupations. However, Smith and Chambers calculate that if we falsely assume that all of the 26,000 security-related jobs in 1984 were held by Protestant males, and work out what would have happened if all these jobs were re-allocated on a proportional basis, then the Protestant male unemployment rate would be 18.8 per cent and the Catholic one would be 29.7 per cent, compared to the actual position in 1983-5 of 35.1 per cent for Catholics and 14.9 per cent for Protestants. (Readers are advised that there is an unfortunate misprint on p. 194 in which the Catholic

and Protestant figures in the above calculation are accidentally transposed).

The authors establish why there are deep inequalities in standard of living between Catholics and Protestants. A considerably higher proportion of Protestant than of Catholic men are in work. A higher proportion of Protestant than of Catholic women are in work, so there are a higher proportion of Protestant than Catholic double-income families. The wealthier Protestant households on average support smaller families. Protestants (especially men) tend to have jobs higher up organizational hierarchies at all age-ranges. Finally, Protestants, especially those in lower-range occupations, are more likely than Catholics to work overtime. These inequalities do nothing to resolve the politics of antagonism in Northern Ireland.

The British government responded to the PSI and SACHR reports by promising a new *Fair Employment Act* (1989). Nominally it remedied the weaknesses in the 1976 Act, but has been criticized by anti-discrimination experts. The white paper and first draft of the bill which preceded it were demonstrably flawed; and, despite some key concessions made by the government in the bill's passage through Westminster, critics believe the final legislation lacks the sophistication required for the task in hand. The past record of British governments and Northern Irish courts in this policy arena do not inspire confidence. However, Smith and Chambers's clearly written treatise should renew sociologists' confidence both in the technical and the radical capacities of empirically sophisticated social science. Their book should be read by anyone interested in Northern Ireland or in applied social research.

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The Social Effects of Free Market Policies
Ian Taylor (ed.) Harvester Wheatsheaf 1990 402pp. £50.00 (£13.95 paper)

The East is blue, Japanese capital dominates Asia, Thatcherism recurs like a